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	1.	Introduction
	The current humanitarian crisis in the Sudan has reawakened the discussion concerning the rights and wrongs of humanitarian intervention.​[1]​ Some four-five years and two years ago, this discussion was carried out intensively at the diplomatic level and in the pages of academic journals against the background of the NATO intervention in Kosovo.​[2]​ The recurring nature of the discussion reflects not only the unfortunate reality that large scale violations of human rights form a systemic problem or which the international community has no instant solution. It also reflects the fact that humanitarian intervention is a highly complex subject which can, and to at least some extent must be approached in a way which takes account of political, ethical and legal considerations.
	This is illustrated by the above-mentioned example of the intervention by NATO in Kosovo. The fact that it was carried out without a specific mandate from the UN Security Council was an important, but by no means the only consideration relating to the way the intervention was viewed and assessed by the international community. An analysis which only took account of whether or not a specific case of humanitarian intervention was carried out with a UN mandate would ignore important elements of the overall problem and would contain a large measure of artificiality.​[3]​ On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the legal dimension of any decision to utilize force, including in relation to humanitarian intervention, without potentially undermining the international system, risking the possibility of diplomatic isolation for a given military operation. This in turn is illustrated by the example of the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and a handful of its closest allies; which while not primarily based upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, does show the pitfalls of military intervention without a clear and generally accepted legal basis. It makes a great deal of difference whether a given military intervention has a clear legal basis, or is widely perceived as being illegal, or perhaps is seen as falling somewhere in between these two extremes.
In order to provide an indication of the present legal status of humanitarian intervention, we will first attempt to provide a clear definition of what is meant by the term, and indicate its place within the contemporary legal framework regulating the use of force. This will be followed by a short historical excursion to examine the possible relevance of the natural law concept of ‘just war’ (bellum justum) and of nineteenth century State practice to the current debate concerning the legality and acceptability of humanitarian intervention, since both of those precedents are often referred to in one way or another in the context of the current debate. Finally we will advance a set of criteria which take account of the political and ethical dimension of humanitarian intervention within a legal context. We will conclude by attempting to illustrate how political and ethical considerations, alongside legal ones can function as mitigating or exonerating factors in relation to humanitarian intervention and its overall status within the contemporary legal system.
	2.	Humanitarian Intervention and Contemporary International Law
	2.1	Definition of Humanitarian Intervention
There are few topics within public international law which are the subject of so much controversy and disagreement and for which there are so many conflicting definitions as humanitarian intervention.​[4]​ Sometimes it is defined as very broadly so as to include various forms of diplomatic activity and humanitarian assistance alongside different types of military activity, ranging from UN peacekeeping missions with a humanitarian objective to full-scale warfare (ostensibly) on behalf of an entire population, or a population group.​[5]​ Other definitions limit it to military activity undertaken by the international community as a whole, by a regional organization or by an individual State or group of States in situations whereby fundamental human rights of a population or minority group are severely threatened.​[6]​
The classic definition of humanitarian intervention is even narrower in scope and only includes military activity by one or more States to put an end to widespread and flagrant violations of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life, without any form of authorization or consent from the government of the State where the intervention takes place.​[7]​ It should be borne in mind that the choice of a particular definition has much more than mere semantic or academic significance. The definition chosen will inevitably have great importance for determining the existence and nature of a possible legal basis for such an intervention.
Only military activity falls within the scope of prohibition of the use of force​[8]​, while diplomatic pressure, other types of non-military sanctions and humanitarian assistance is governed by other rules and principles of international law. Even if one limits the definition to military activity, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between activity which has the consent of the government of the State where the military activity is conducted and situations where no such consent or authorization is given, or where it meets with active resistance. In the first type of situation, there is no question of intervention in a legal sense and no violation of sovereignty of occurs​[9]​, while in the second there is clearly a situation of intervention, which will require some form of legal justification.
Another equally fundamental distinction is that between interventions which are carried out with a clear authorization by the Security Council; either to a (coalition of) State(s) under Chapter VIII of the Charter; and interventions which are carried out without any such authorization, either by a State, or by a regional organization. Although a UN authorized military intervention which is carried out without the consent of the target State is clearly a form of “intervention”, it is one which has a generally recognized legal basis and as such will possess a presumption of legality.​[10]​
The UN Charter provides the Security Council with far-reaching powers in the maintenance of international peace and security and a wide degree of discretion in the determination of whether a given situation constitutes a threat to or a breach of the peace. The practice of the Security Council since the end of the Cold War clearly shows that the Council is prepared to utilize its enforcement powers in response to humanitarian crises and serious violations of human rights, provided the political will to act is present and the interests of the major powers and regional groups within the UN coincide sufficiently to ensure that they will at least not actively oppose initiatives within the Council to provide authorization for military action.​[11]​
The non-intervention principle contained in Article 2(7) of the Charter does not apply to enforcement measures taken by the Council, or with the Council’s authorization. Such intervention is often referred to as “collective humanitarian intervention” to distinguish it from situations in which no such authorization by the Security Council is forthcoming. Only in situations in which the Council is unwilling or unable to provide such authorization, is there a need to justify the military intervention on the basis of a separate legal doctrine of “humanitarian intervention”. 
A final distinction should be made to avoid confusion. A significant number of States and numerous authors take the position that military intervention which is aimed at protecting or evacuating the nationals of the intervening State has a basis in the right of self-defense. A related theory is that action undertaken by a State to rescue its national from a grave threat to their lives or physical safety has its basis in a customary right of “rescue of nationals” which is separate from, but related to the right of self-defense.​[12]​ There is considerable controversy concerning the existence and scope of such a right, although on balance the arguments for accepting a limited right of protection of nationals within the scope of the right of self-defense seem to this author to be the most persuasive.​[13]​ However, be that as it may, and irrespective of whether one agrees or not, there are good reasons to distinguish such a right from a broader right of humanitarian intervention in order to avoid confusion. Keeping such a distinction as to what is meant by the term “humanitarian intervention” and further avoid the application of the concept of self-defense to situations where it would be wholly inapplicable, such as military intervention on behalf of a threatened population to protect it from depredations by its own government, or other groups within the State where the intervention takes place.
Consequently, the “classic” definition of humanitarian intervention is clearer and more precise than definitions which are broader in scope or can have other legal justifications, such as collective security or self-defense. As such humanitarian intervention is defined for the purposes of this article as: military activity by one or more States – irrespective of whether they are part of a military alliance or regional organization – aimed at putting an end to or protecting persons not of its (their) nationality who are subjected to serious violations of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life, without the consent of the target State and without any form of authorization by the UN Security Council.
	2.2	The Legal Status of Humanitarian Intervention
The choice for the abovementioned classic definition of humanitarian intervention signifies that the legality of humanitarian intervention depends upon the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter – and the existence of a further exception to the prohibition alongside those explicitly named in the Charter; namely the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security through collective security measures taken under the authority of the UN Security Council and the right of Member States of the UN to individual and collective self-defense.
	2.2.1	Humanitarian Intervention and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
Most proponents of humanitarian intervention contend that the prohibition of the use of force is not incompatible with the concept of humanitarian intervention. According to this reasoning, humanitarian intervention is in accordance with one of the main objectives of the UN Charter – the promotion of respect for and observance of human rights and as such, humanitarian interventions is said not to be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of States, but simply aimed at protecting the inhabitants of States from abuses or breakdowns of States authority.​[14]​
This teleological interpretation of the UN Charter (and of international law in a more general sense) is especially influential in the United States among the supporters of the ‘policy oriented approach’ developed by Professors Mc Dougal, Lasswell and Reisman of Yale University.
This theoretical approach says – at the risk of a degree of oversimplification – that treaties and other rules of public international law should be interpreted in such a way as to promote democratic values and human dignity to the maximum extent as long as this does not entail the risk of a dangerous confrontation or war between nuclear powers, referred to as “minimum world order”. According to this approach, the realization of the objectives of the UN Charter is dependent upon the extent which democracy, the liberal world economic order and human rights are strengthened.​[15]​ As such, humanitarian intervention can be a necessary and legal response to large-scale violations of human rights – as long as it does not involve the risk of nuclear confrontation or all-out war between major powers. This was the reason why humanitarian intervention in the former Soviet bloc, or in the Peoples Republic of China was and is unfeasible, while it can be a possible and legal option in Haiti, Somalia or Kosovo. This theoretical approach to international law has considerable prestige within the United States and has had a certain influence upon UN foreign policy. Since the United States is such a powerful and influential country it is impossible to ignore this school of opinion whatever one otherwise thinks of it in legal terms.
Notwithstanding the influence of this particular theoretical approach, this is by no means the most persuasive or widely accepted interpretation of the Charter, or of the prohibition of the use of force. The premise that force which is used for a benign purpose is legal so long as it does not entail a risk of nuclear confrontation, is not one which is easily reconcilable with the text and drafting of the Charter, or which commands much response  in the wider international community.
As analysis of the text of Article 2(4) of the Charter within the context of the rest of the Charter, together with the drafting history of the Charter makes it clear that the prohibition of the use of force should be interpreted broadly. This conclusion is reinforced by important interpretative resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Corfu Channel and Nicaragua​[16]​decisions of the International Court of Justice. It is also the position of the clear majority of leading authorities on the use of force in international law including a large number of American publicists.​[17]​
According to this leading interpretation, Article 2(4) should be seen as prohibiting all uses or threats of force, except those which are specifically provided with a legal basis in the Charter. The exceptions named in the Charter in the context of the UN collective security system and the right of individual and collective self-defense. This means that other uses of force are in principle illegal, unless perhaps there is convincing evidence of emergence of a new customary rule which would provide a legal basis for a new exception.
	2.2.2	Humanitarian Intervention as Customary Law
As stated previously, alongside the possibility that humanitarian intervention does not fall under the prohibition of the use of force, a second argument in favor of the legality of humanitarian intervention has often been advanced, in the form of an alleged customary basis for such a right.
This alleged customary rule of law is said to have its roots partly in the natural law theories of the founders of international law, as well as in the 19th century practice of the European Great Powers.​[18]​ Moreover, this historical basis is said to have been further developed in the post-Charter era through the practice of a number of interventions by various States to put an end to large-scale human rights violations. Only those interventions without a UN Security Council authorization will be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether humanitarian intervention is recognized a providing as an independent legal basis for the use of military force, at the inter-State level.
The interventions which are most often cited in this context in the period since 1945 include the Indian intervention in Bangladesh in 1971, the intervention by Tanzania to put an end to the regime of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1978-79, the intervention by Vietnam in Cambodia which overthrew the rule of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge in 1978-79 and the French intervention in the Central African Republic which put an end to the rule of self proclaimed emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa in 1979. More recent examples include the military intervention by a number of the Western members of the Gulf War Coalition to protect the Kurdish population of North Iraq in 1991 and the aerial campaign by the members of NATO in Kosovo in 1999 aimed at ending human rights violations by Yugoslav Government against the ethnic Albanian population.​[19]​ 
We will turn to the significance of natural law concepts of ‘just war’ (bellum justum) and 19th century State practice in relation to a customary right of humanitarian intervention in a subsequent part of this essay.​[20]​ At present, we will concentrate on the question whether there is a customary right of humanitarian intervention under contemporary international law.
The requirements for the existence of a rule of customary law are well known and have been formulated in a number of decisions of the International Court of Justice, as well as in the writings of numerous publicists. Essentially these are the existence of a reasonably widespread and consistent practice by a representative group of States over an indeterminate period of time, which is accompanied by the manifestation of a legal conviction that the practice reflects a legal right to do (or to abstain from doing) whatever it is that the practice is concerned with.​[21]​ 
If we apply these criteria to the question of humanitarian intervention it is open to serious doubt whether there is sufficient evidence for the existence of a customary basis for humanitarian intervention, much less for a new exception to the prohibition of the use of force contained in the UN Charter. 
The interventions of India in Bangladesh, of Vietnam in Cambodia and of Tanzania in Uganda in the 1970’s were primarily based upon the claims of self-defense and not upon an alleged right of humanitarian intervention. As such, they form dubious precedents for the existence of such a right. This becomes even clearer if we take the reaction of the international community into account. The intervention of Vietnam met with the almost universal condemnation of the international community, while that of India in Bangladesh was opposed by a significant number of States, although its outcome – the independence of Bangladesh – was ultimately accepted by the international community. Although the intervention of Tanzania in Uganda enjoyed a greater degree of understanding, at least initially, its value as a precedent in favour of a generally accepted right of humanitarian intervention is limited due to the reputation and degree of isolation of the overthrown dictator Idi Amin, and the fact that the Tanzanian supported administration of President Obote quickly earned an almost equally negative reputation in the area of respect for humanitarian rights as its predecessor. The French intervention against ‘Emperor’ Jean Bedel Bokassa was not so much condemned or supported as tolerated – a point which we will return to presently.​[22]​
The intervention by a number of Western States which formed the core of the Gulf War Coalition in Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990-91, does not serve as a clear precedent of the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention. ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ which was carried out by more than 13,000 troops under the leadership of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to protect hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds, was largely justified on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions and was viewed by the most concerned States within the Council and in the region as a special case which was closely linked to the Gulf War and the role of the Council in that conflict.​[23]​ Under the specific circumstances which prevailed in the immediate aftermath of the expulsion of Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait and the bloody suppression of a popular uprising against the Iraqi Government, the Council was willing, by a narrow majority, to condemn Iraqi repression of its Kurdish population; and States such as Russia, China, India and Iran, which are normally critical of humanitarian intervention, were willing to condone Western intervention in that specific case, but this cannot be inflated into an acceptance of a general right of humanitarian intervention.​[24]​
The fact that the Security Council was prepared to condemn the Iraqi Government’s repression of its Kurdish population and that the international community showed a significant degree of or understanding towards the Western intervention in Northern Iraq contributed to a shift in Security Council responses to humanitarian crises in subsequent situations, such as Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, but this provides little support for the existence of a customary right of humanitarian intervention outside the context of the UN collective security system.​[25]​
At this point, we can conclude that there is insufficient evidence for the existence of a customary right of humanitarian intervention as defined earlier in this essay. The most frequently used examples were neither based upon, nor were they accepted as precedents for the existence or emergence of such a right. Although the example of ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ is significant in the sense of indicating a partial shift in the attitude of the Security Council in relation to internal conflicts and humanitarian crises, it is too closely bound up with the Gulf Conflict to serve as a precedent for a general customary right of humanitarian intervention.
On the other hand, we can also conclude that in a number of situations, probably a growing number, the international community did not openly condemn, or if it did it often did not go beyond verbal condemnation of a number of interventions which were at least partly motivated by humanitarian considerations or which had a favourable humanitarian effect.
This was the case in relation to the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, the French intervention in Central Africa and the Western intervention in Northern Iraq. It was also arguably the case – albeit to a lesser extent in relation to the Indian intervention in Bangladesh, although it was definitely not the case in relation to the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. This was the State of the law at the outset of the Kosovo crisis of 1998-9; namely in some cases no open acceptance of a right of humanitarian intervention, but no open condemnation either, which can best be described as a form of tolerance or condonement, provided certain conditions were met. The significance of this will be examined subsequently in this essay.
	3	Historical Antecedents for a Right of Humanitarian Intervention
As stated earlier, proponents of humanitarian intervention often point to the historical roots of the modern day concept in natural law theory relating to ‘just war’ and in 19th century State practice as providing further support for the existence of its customary Status. In this paragraph we will briefly examine the historical significance of these two traditions and the relation thereof to a modern right of humanitarian intervention.
	3.1	The ‘Just War’ Tradition and Humanitarian Intervention
The natural law doctrine of ‘just war’ (bellum justum) is, or more accurately was, an amalgamation of various ethical and protolegal principles and attitudes which combined elements of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy of the Stoic tradition, Roman law and tradition relating to the conduct of war, medieval scholastic theology and Renaissance humanism. These elements were worked out during the High Renaissance and Reformation into a reasonably coherent theory by the founders of modern international law, such as the Spaniards Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, the Italian Alberico Gentili and the Dutchman Hugo de Groot (Grotius). Although this tradition combined a number of elements and divergent viewpoints on a variety of issues and extended over disparate historical period, it did contain a number of core principles and a surprising degree of agreement regarding the conditions under which the use of force was justified.​[26]​
It is undeniable that within this tradition, one of the just causes for the waging of war as referred to in the writings of inter alia Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius, was on behalf of a population which was subjected to extreme tyranny, cruelty and “unnatural practices”, such as human sacrifice, cannibalism and so forth. Another cause which was generally seen as providing an ethical- legal basis for war was on behalf of Christian subjects of a foreign (non-Christian) ruler who were subjected to a ‘just cause’ was one of the three basic core principles necessary for a ‘just war’ within the bellum justum tradition and these references to humanitarian interventions for taking up arms can be seen as providing an ethical and historical basis for the modern day concept of humanitarian intervention to at least some extent, although they should not be exaggerated or taken out of context.​[27]​ 
Modern day just war theorists, such as Walzer and Johnson have attempted to transform this theory into a more secular, modern and liberal system of ethics and have provided a worthwhile contribution to a moral philosophical perspective relating to the use of force.​[28]​ However, its real importance in this author’s view is in the historical significance and contribution of just war theory to the development of modern international law. Although it ceased to be the leading normative framework for the assessment of when force could be used from the early 18th century onwards, it can, to a significant extent, be seen as the historical antecedent of modern international law and continues to exert a certain influence today as part of Western perceptions of morality and ethics. We will return to its legal significance  for the assessment of the use of force for humanitarian purposes in a contemporary context presently, after examining a second historical antecedent to modern day humanitarian intervention.
	3.2	19th Century Liberalism and State Practice in Relation to Humanitarian Intervention
At least as important as just war theory to modern day conceptions of humanitarian intervention, are the influence of 19th century liberalism and its influence upon the State practice of the major powers of the period between 1815 and 1914. In this period, which was characterized by a strongly positivistic conception of law that stood in sharp contrast to the natural law orientation of the ‘just war’ tradition, States were in principle free to use force to further their interests and international law considered decisions relating to use of force and what constituted the national interest to be completely outside the scope of law.
However, alongside this strongly positivistic legal perspective, there was nevertheless a fairly influential liberal intellectual current of opinion which on the one hand tried to promote arbitration and other forms of dispute settlement as alternatives to war whenever possible and on the other hand supported military intervention and action as a means to suppress inhumane practices such as the slave trade and the suppression of the Christian subjects of the decaying Ottoman Empire.​[29]​ This liberal current of opinion had a certain influence upon the policies of the Great Powers of the era, which often cited humanitarian considerations for the numerous interventions which were carried out in the Balkans, the Near East and the Caribbean. Examples of such interventions include that of France, Great Britain and Russia in 1828 on behalf of the Greek insurgents, resulting in the independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire in 1930; the French intervention in Lebanon of 1860 on behalf of its Maronite Christian population; the Russian intervention in Bulgaria in 1877-78 in support of Bulgarian resistance to Ottoman rule and the intervention in 1898 by the United States on behalf of the Cuban insurrection against Spanish rule. These interventions are often cited by proponents of humanitarian intervention as support for its customary status and can be seen as one of the historical antecedents of the present day concept of humanitarian intervention.​[30]​
	3.3	 Significance of Historical Antecedents from a Contemporary Perspective
The fact that humanitarian intervention is at least partially based upon the natural law tradition of ‘just war’ of the Medieval and Renaissance eras and can also partially trace its roots to the practice of the 19th century Great Powers is of some significance in the discussion relating to humanitarian intervention in the contemporary era. Both supporters and opponents of humanitarian intervention make use of arguments relating to the relevance of these historical antecedents to support their own positions. The supporters refer to these historical antecedents both as evidence of the existence of an ethical underpinning for humanitarian intervention, as well as proof of its political acceptance and customary legal status in the period preceding the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945. According to this school of thought, the fact that such a right existed before 1945 can be seen as further evidence in favor of its continued existence. Moreover, the argument in favor of the customary status of humanitarian intervention is considerably strengthened if the 19th century practice is taken into account alongside the more recent examples of State practice which we examined earlier.​[31]​
The opponents of a right of humanitarian intervention argue to the contrary that the fact that humanitarian intervention was recognized within the natural law doctrine of bellum justum of a bygone era is irrelevant today within a wholly different historical and legal context. They also discount the legal significance of 19th century precedents in the contemporary legal order and point out that the 19th century interventions of the Great Powers were not primarily motivated by humanitarian considerations, but rather by considerations of power politics such as the desire to increase their respective shares of influence, while denying such an increase in power and prestige of their main rivals.​[32]​
In the opinion of this author, the significance of these historical factors depends upon the context in which they are viewed and the purpose for which they are used. From a legal perspective, that is to say, as proof for or against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention under contemporary international law – they are of practically no significance. The fact that humanitarian intervention was recognized within the bellum justum tradition is neither evidence for, nor against the existence of such a right under contemporary international law. One should view ‘just war’ doctrine as part of a normative tradition which preceded modern international law and which has played a significant role in the development of certain moral and ethical principles within Western philosophy. Since moral and ethical considerations play an important role in relation to considerations of justice, fairness and equity, ‘just war’ tradition is of some significance within the debate concerning the ethical dimension of humanitarian intervention. However, this does not mean that the normative viewpoints of classical or modern writers within the ‘just war’ tradition can be cited as proof of the existence of a rule of positive international law within the contemporary legal framework regulating the use of force. This is a question not of the morality of humanitarian intervention, but of its legality in the sense of a recognized rule of law which allows for or prohibits a certain course of action. The viewpoints of Grotius and his predecessors – successors within contemporary just war theory – are of little importance in that context.
The same applies in a somewhat different sense to the importance of 19th century State practice within the contemporary legal context. The practice of the 19th century Great Powers demonstrates that where there is an influential liberal current of opinion, combined with a favorable distribution of power which enables States which are willing and able to undertake humanitarian interventions, it is possible to carry them out with a significant degree of public support and political acceptance. The fact that there may be certain parallels between the 19th century situation and the present is an indication that these factors are of importance for the realization of a favorable political climate in support of humanitarian interventions. This is a question of the legitimacy or political acceptability of such operations, not of their legality in relation to contemporary international law. There are several reasons for this.
Within the context of 19th century international law, humanitarian interventions were neither legal nor illegal. In a system in which States were free in a legal sense to use force to promote and secure national interests, humanitarian considerations for the use of force were not so much a question of legal justification, as political and to some extent moral grounds for legitimizing the numerous interventions which were carried out in that era. Legal justifications were of little significance within a legal system that had practically limitations upon the use of force.
Secondly, even if humanitarian intervention had some legal significance within the context of 19th century international law, this is of little or no legal significance today. We have already seen that the contemporary legal order is based upon a fundamentally different premise, than that which existed in the period between 1815 and 1914; namely the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. As a result, the 19ht century State practice relating to humanitarian intervention cannot be cited as evidence of the existence of such a right in the contemporary legal order. 
In conclusion, we can state that although the natural law tradition and the 19th century State practice of the European Powers have some relevance in relation to discussion concerning the moral and ethical dimension and the political legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, they have no real significance in relation to the question of the legality of such interventions under contemporary international law.​[33]​
	4	Towards a (Legal) Framework for the Assessment of Humanitarian Intervention
	We have previously concluded that humanitarian intervention which is carried out without some form of UN Security Council authorization cannot be legally justified in terms of either a teleological interpretation of the UN Charter, or on the basis of an established rule of customary law. We have also seen that while the historical antecedents of humanitarian intervention can be found in the natural law Bellum Justum tradition and in the 19th century State practice of the European Powers and that this may be of some significance in relation to its moral and political acceptability, it is of little or no legal significance. However, it is clear that while it is important not to blur the discussions between morality, political legitimacy and legality, it is equally unhelpful to conduct the discussion concerning humanitarian intervention without taking account of how the moral-ethical, political and legal dimensions of the question mutually influence each other and are of relevance in terms of the evaluation and assessment of such interventions. In this concluding paragraph, we will attempt to arrive at a framework for assessment of humanitarian intervention which take due account of political and moral considerations in relation to legal ones.
	4.1	Exonerating and Mitigating Circumstances in International Law
	The lack of a generally recognized legal basis for humanitarian intervention means that a possible diminution or exclusion of culpability for conducting a humanitarian intervention must be looked for in the grounds for excluding or mitigating the wrongfulness of any particular act which exists in general international law. In this context, it is important to distinguish between grounds which provide a total exculpation for what would otherwise be a wrongful act, and grounds which would reduce, but not totally remove the wrongfulness of a particular act. The former are generally referred to as exculpatory or exonerative circumstances, while the latter are usually referred to as mitigating circumstances. Grounds for exoneration or exculpation are also known as “circumstances precluding wrongfulness” within the context of the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) in relation to State Responsibility.​[34]​
	The ILC has devoted considerable attention to the concept of circumstances precluding wrongfulness over the long period of time it has been engaged with the topic of State Responsibility. An examination of the (Draft) Articles on State Responsibility, together with the opinions of the Special Rapporteurs of the ILC engaged on the topic and of the State commentaries makes clear that none of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness identified by the ILC are applicable to the question of humanitarian intervention. Four of the six exculpatory grounds identified by the ILC have no relevance whatsoever to the topic of humanitarian intervention and need not concern us further.​[35]​ The other two grounds which at least potentially could have some relevance are equally inapplicable to the question of humanitarian intervention. The first of these, countermeasures in response to a prior illegal act, may never involve the use of force according to both the work of the ILC and numerous resolutions by both of the UN political organs, including the important interpretative Resolution 2625 of the General Assembly of 1970 – which states categorically that “States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force”.​[36]​ This also applies to the other potential candidate termed “state of necessity” by the ILC. Not only is this because “necessity” is not a necessarily premised upon the occurrence of a prior illegal act, which would hardly be credible in relation to military action to put an end to serious violations of fundamental human rights, but more importantly, because a “state of necessity” may never be invoked to transgress a rule of a peremptory character, which certainly includes Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.​[37]​
	Since humanitarian intervention cannot be based on any of the recognized legal exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force and none of the hitherto recognized grounds for exculpation in the form of the ILC’s circumstances precluding wrongfulness are applicable, this means that humanitarian intervention is illegal. The question of the degree of illegality of humanitarian intervention and the legal consequences of such an act, is in fact a reference to the concept of mitigating circumstances which have their basis in general principles of law, and which alongside treaty and custom are recognized as one of the primary sources of public international law.
	The application of mitigating circumstances forms part of virtually every system of law. The application of mitigating circumstances – whether in the context of private law or criminal law – is seen as part of the legal process itself, although it necessarily involves the taking into account of extra-legal considerations. These include the factual circumstances relating to a particular act, the motivation of the parties and the moral and legal policy implications of the act, which in the context of national legal systems are generally applied within the framework of a formal legal trial. This is the task of either the judges, or in legal systems where juries are employed, the task of the judge and jury working in conjunction within their respective functions.
	At the international level, the evaluation and application of both extra legal and legal factors which possibly can play a role in the mitigation of an illegal act take place in a wholly different context. Only rarely will this be even partially within the framework of formal legal proceedings before an international court or tribunal. One example where this did occur was within the context of the Corfu Channel case, where the International Court after determining the wrongfulness of the United Kingdom’s conduct in sweeping mines from the territorial waters of Albania, went on to determine that Albania’s conduct had contributed to the situation, that a declaratory judgment in favour of Albania’s claim was sufficient satisfaction for its claims and that Albania was liable for the payment of damages to the United Kingdom for the loss of life and material damage the United Kingdom had suffered. In short, the Court took account of these factors as constituting mitigating circumstances in relation to the United Kingdom’s culpability for its illegal action.​[38]​ While this illustrates the recognition of mitigating factors at international law, it remains a lonely example of a Court decision where mitigating circumstances were applied. This is, of course, due to the wholly different role that international courts play within the international legal system as compared to their domestic counterparts. 
	In the decentralized international legal system, the evaluation and application of possible mitigating factors will normally take place within the informal structure of international relations, both at the level of institutionalized diplomacy in UN organs, as well as within the context of more traditional diplomacy. Within this process, the factual circumstances, the motivation of the parties, the way in which the act was conducted and justified and its wider political, legal and moral implications will all play a role in the way States react to it. When a State carries out a humanitarian intervention which takes account of these extra legal as well as legal factors, it is likely that the reaction of the international community will be one of a significant degree of acceptance or tolerance, without necessarily wishing to declare such acts legal in the abstract.​[39]​ This is in fact the application of mitigating circumstances at the international level, and this is where the extra legal considerations of morality and political acceptability are relevant to the legal process. 
	To the extent a larger number of States openly welcome, or express understanding and tolerance for a particular intervention, it will enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy, especially if this includes States from more than one particular region or political alignment or cultural tradition and among these, the major powers are represented. Within this context, different considerations and factors will play a role including ones of a political, ethical and legal nature. If the three elements are reasonably balanced, there will be a greater likelihood that the intervention will be accepted or condoned. This in turn has a legal significance, in that it demonstrates a willingness to apply mitigating circumstances to an otherwise illegal act in terms of positive international law in such a way that diminished – in some cases potentially to a merely formal reaffirmation of the transgressed norm, while refraining from attaching any practical consequences to the illegality of the act, in much the same way the International Court did in relation to the abovementioned Corfu Channel case. However, since international law largely functions outside the courtroom, the process of applying mitigating circumstances will likewise usually take place within the setting of international relations and diplomacy. This in turn is a product of the decentralized and largely non-hierarchical character of the international legal system itself. The fact that overtly political environment than its domestic counterpart does not however, deprive it of its juridical character.​[40]​
4.2	Criteria for the Evaluation of Humanitarian Intervention
	Various authors and organizations which have treated the subject of humanitarian intervention have formulated criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian intervention which pose requirements that any such intervention should meet. Interestingly enough, these criteria and requirements display a large degree of similarity, irrespective of the perspective of the analyst and even irrespective of whether the analyst supports or opposes humanitarian intervention as a general proposition. These criteria can be summed up as follows:​[41]​
		i	humanitarian intervention should only be undertaken in situations where serious and large scale violations of fundamental human rights, especially the right to life, are taking place or are clearly likely to take place in the immediate future;
	ii	humanitarian intervention by individual States or coalitions of States should only serve as an ultimum remedium in situations where other means of protection or pressure would clearly be inadequate and in which the UN Security Council is either unwilling or unable to act on the basis of the UN collective security system;
	iii	the intervening State(s) should be relatively disinterested in the sense that they are not using humanitarian intervention as a pretext to realize other interests, or in any case humanitarian motives should play an important role in any decision to intervene;
	iv	the intervention should have a reasonable prospect of success;
	v	the intervention should be carried out in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality, that is to say, sufficient force to bring an end to the violations, but no more than is necessary to achieve that end and no longer than the violations occur, or threaten to continue;
	vi	the intervention should moreover be proportionate in the sense that it does not pose a greater risk to regional stability, or to international peace and security in a wider context.
(II)?	These criteria contain legal, political and ethical considerations to a greater or lesser degree. They are closely related and interdependent, but retain their distinctness nevertheless. The relationship between these elements is so close and so important, precisely because we are dealing with a form of action which is widely considered to be illegal in principle. This lack of prima facie legality both increases the importance of the political and ethical dimension of the question, while at the same time serving as a means of distinguishing between degrees of illegality, so as to prevent too wide a gulf between what the law allows and what is considered to be morally imperative and politically acceptable.​[42]​
	It is often contended that humanitarian intervention is open to abuse. Moreover, it has often been pointed out that there are few – if any – examples of disinterested humanitarian intervention which have not been undertaken to promote other interests. The fact that these criticisms contain large elements of truth is not a reason to conclude that mitigating factors may not be present where interventions significantly conform to the requirements laid down in the above stated criteria. Many legal rules are susceptible to abuse and many do not contain criteria for their assessment which are more precise than those which have been formulated for humanitarian intervention.
	As regards the question of ‘purity’ of motivation on the part of the intervening State(s), it would seem that a degree of realism is called for. However universal fundamental human rights such as the prevention of genocide may be, it is unrealistic to expect that States will be willing to undertake military intervention, with all the risks that such action entails, without regard to other interests alongside the protection of human rights. The fear of destabilization in the region concerned, the limitation of spill over effects in the form of refugee flows, ideological opposition towards the government of the target State or solidarity with an ally which is confronted with these problems will usually also play a role alongside humanitarian considerations. This is not a reason in itself to deem such interventions as ‘impure’. As long as they meet the general criteria for the assessment of humanitarian intervention for accepting the mitigation of responsibility. The examples from both 19th century as more recent State practice indicate that precisely those States which have the most interests in a particular region aims to put an end to a serious violation of human rights.​[43]​
	4.3	Application Mitigating Criteria and their Legal Consequences
	The question arises as to which (legal) consequences should be attached to a given humanitarian intervention on the basis of the above stated evaluation criteria. Closely related is the question as to which further requirements of a procedural nature can be posed to States which undertake a humanitarian intervention, in order to enable a reasonably effective and objective evaluation and assessment of their conduct. It is reasonable that a State or group of States which undertake an action which is prima facie illegal, should be expected to provide a full explanation and motivation for its conduct if it expects mitigating factors to be taken into account. This is even the case where a State makes use of a recognized legal right, such as self-defense, so there should be no reason to expect less from a State which undertakes a humanitarian intervention. 
	As long as there is no generally recognized legal basis for humanitarian intervention, it seems clear that the burden of proof will rest upon the intervening State(s). This means at least that nay State which undertakes a humanitarian intervention is under an obligation to provide as full an explanation of its conduct and motivation, as well as of its objectives in carrying out the operation, as is possible. Since the UN Security Council exercises primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, it is logical and reasonable to expect the intervening State(s) to provide such explanation and motivation to that body. Providing such an explanation and motivation is not necessarily the same thing as requesting an authorization. In situations where it is clear that an authorization is unlikely to be forthcoming, it is not so much a question of a symbolic attempt at obtaining an authorization, as providing an explanation to the competent international authority. 
	This would contribute to the avoidance of miscalculation and escalation and the limitation of damage to the international legal order and system of collective security. It would, moreover, confront the Council with the consequences of its own inaction. There are, roughly speaking, three situations which can result from such a course of action:
a.	the Security Council decides after all to provide an authorization for the action, in which case it would obtain a legal basis and enjoy a much greater degree of political legitimacy;
b.	the Security Council comes to a clear condemnation of the action and issues a cease and desist order. This would clearly signify that the intervention did not possess either a basis for political legitimacy or for the application of mitigating considerations in a legal sense. In practice, such a condemnation would likely only occur in cases where a claim of humanitarian intervention was merely a pretext for aggression. It is improbable that a State or group of States which could plausibly demonstrate legitimizing factors would be confronted with a condemnation although there may be exceptions to this general proposition;
	c.	the Security Council is incapable of reaching either an authorization or a condemnation, in which case it will be up the wider international community to determine to what extent mitigating circumstances were present on the basis of the general criteria for evaluation.
	To the extent a particular intervention meets the criteria, the legal situation would be one of an illegal act, but one to which no significant legal or political consequences were attached. This is the best description of what has actually transpired in a number of more or less recent examples of humanitarian intervention. The interventions of India in Bangladesh, of Tanzania in Uganda and of France in the Central African Republic were all treated as violations of the prohibition of the use of force to a greater or lesser extent, but ones to which no significant legal or political consequences were attached. The same applies to the intervention of the Coalition States in Northern Iraq, the interventions of ECOWAS in West Africa preceding their subsequent endorsement by the Security Council and most recently the NATO intervention in Kosovo. None of these interventions singly or taken together have given rise to a widely accepted right of humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, these interventions have conformed by a large with the general criteria for the application of mitigating circumstances. In none of these cases were any lasting or significant legal or political consequences attached to these interventions; on the contrary the resulting situations were given a wide degree of acceptance.​[44]​
	5 	Conclusions
The question of humanitarian intervention possesses an ethical and political dimension alongside a legal one. In legal terms it seems clear that notwithstanding contentious to the contrary, there is as of yet no widely accepted legal basis for it, either in terms of Charter or customary international law. Nor does the fact that humanitarian intervention can at least partially base its intellectual and historical roots in the bellum justum  tradition and in the 19th century practice of the European Great Powers change this, although these traditions are not without relevance in demonstrating the ethical and political dimension of humanitarian intervention.
	Since humanitarian intervention does not have a generally recognized legal basis and none of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness worked out by the ILC over a long period apply, it follows that humanitarian intervention is illegal in principle.
	On the other hand, illegality comes in various degrees and the consequences of an illegal act will vary and can be mitigated in international law as in any legal system. This is where a combination of legal and extra-legal factors play a role in assessing what the consequences of a given example of humanitarian intervention should be, on the basis of a set of generally recognized criteria which take account of the various elements involved. However, this process, though influenced by extra-legal considerations, nevertheless forms part of the legal process, even though this usually takes place within the context of international diplomacy rather than within the formal setting of court proceedings, due to the specific characteristics of the international legal system itself.
	As such, and until the time is ripe for the recognition of a legal basis for humanitarian intervention, this seems to be a reasonable solution to a difficult problem. The fact that there are situations in which it is morally and politically unacceptable to stand by while large scale violations of fundamental human rights are taking place is no reason to deny the importance of legal considerations relating to the use of force, to pretend that the law already allows new exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force which the international community is not ready to accept, or still less to cast the prohibition aside. The first victim of such a course of action would almost certainly be the most fundamental of human rights itself – the right not to live under the perpetual threat of war.
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